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Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies behind the Veil 
Mona Simion1 
 
ABSTRACT. Interest in giving priority to the worst off by the use of a maximin 
decision strategy enjoys a recent resurgence in the literature on distributive justice. 
This paper examines the theoretical presuppositions underlying the main objections 
brought by the supporters of maximin to John Harsanyi’s utilitarian position. It is 
argued that, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, the use of non-probabilistic 
strategies associated with cautious decision makers is not bound to fare better in 
benefitting risk aversion. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his writings on justice, John Rawls notably introduced an initial testing procedure 
he dubbed ‘the original position’. It describes a hypothetical situation in which 
several rational, self-interested agents are placed behind a so called ´veil of 
ignorance´ and asked to make a definitive decision on what type of society they 
would live in (Rawls 1999, 13-14). Rawls argues that the rational agents in the 
original position would choose according to a maximin decision strategy; that is, 
they would choose to maximize the worst possible payoff. He backs this by arguing 
that the situation itself drives the agents to act as risk-averse decision makers,2 as this 
is no regular every-day decision, but one which will affect all of their future life and 
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all their future decisions.  
 Notably, contra Rawls, John Harsanyi argues that, while some degree of risk-
aversion within the original position is rationally sustainable by the uniqueness of the 
situation and the weight of the decision, Rawlsian agents are characterized by an 
extreme, highly irrational risk-aversion in choosing the maximin strategy (1975: 
598). That is because, while the moral flaw of the utility principle was that it allowed 
for the sacrifice of a minority, in aiming for the increased good of the majority, the 
maximin strategy allows for an even more abominable situation in which a large 
majority would be sacrificed for the interests of a small minority. Thus, Harsanyi 
argues that the rational thing to do behind the veil is to assign equal probabilities to 
all possible outcomes and maximize expected utility.  
 Still, on a first approximation, the question seems to amount to deciding 
between risking to be overburdened to the benefit of a small minority of less 
naturally endowed – in a maximin society - or risking to be among the worst off in a 
utilitarian society. The latter, of course, might imply finding oneself way below a 
decent level of welfare. This has led to a wide spread support for the maximin 
strategy in recent literature3. Roughly put, two objections have been brought to 
Harsanyi´s account: 1) since in Rawls´s original position we have no reason for 
choosing one probability assignment over another, there are no grounds for the equi-
probability assumption; 2) while this does not lead us directly to the maximin rule, 
the particular decision at hand mandates its use due to the agents´ risk aversion. 
 The purpose of this paper is a further examination of the theoretical 
presuppositions lying at the heart of the above objections to Harsanyi´s position. 
That is, I purport to investigate 1) to which extent non-probabilistic strategies fare 
better than expected utility maximization in keeping with the risk aversion Rawls has 
thrown upon the agents behind the veil and 2) whether Harsanyi´s equi-probability 
assumption is an unavoidable theoretical cost associated with the use of the utility 
principle in Rawls´s setting. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 E.g. Angner (2002), Chon´e and Laroque (2005), Maniquet and Sprumont (2004), McClennen 
(2010), Resnick (1987) Shrader-Frechette (1991), Tungodden (2000). 
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 To this effect, I will first briefly revisit what has become known in the 
literature as the Rawls vs. Harsanyi dispute. Further on, I will use several variations 
on Harsanyi´s objections in order to argue that using a maximin strategy behind the 
veil may expose the agents to more serious risks than the ones involved in 
maximizing expected utility (2). Section #3 will deal with the arguments brought 
against Harsanyi´s equi-probability assumption. I will then consider an alternative 
escape route for the defender of the use of non-probabilistic strategies, that is, 
choosing to focus on lost opportunities rather than on maximizing the worst possible 
payoff, and show how it fails (4). In the last section I will conclude. 
 
 
2. The Choice 
 
Rawls´s veil of ignorance presupposes that agents, though in possession of general 
information about politics, economics and psychology, and about the scarcity of 
resources and the necessary primary goods, are completely ignorant regarding their 
particular position in society, personal talents, religion and cultural background 
(Rawls 1999, 11). So what Rawls purports to do is provide us with a model of 
deciding what society to live in which is bound to be fair for each and every one of 
its members, as the decision regarding its structure is made by people who, for all 
they know, could find themselves in any position in society.  
 Rawls argues that the original position would discourage agents from 
choosing to maximize expected utility. As long as the utility principle allows for the 
sacrifice of innocent scapegoats for the greater good of the greater number, agents 
could not risk being among such scapegoats. Also, they are ignorant regarding the 
number of least-advantaged positions in the society they will end up in. So, for all 
they know, their probability of being among the worst off might well be very high. 
As such, according to Rawls, the special circumstances associated with the original 
position demand a cautious, maximin decision, observing the greatest advantage of 
the worst off. 
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It has become common in the literature discussing the decision strategy 
behind the veil of ignorance to assume that Rawls’s principles for ‘justice as 
fairness’, in particular his well known ‘difference principle’ – asking for social and 
economic inequalities to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged - rest on the employment of the maximin behind the veil.4 
Crucially, though, in several places, Rawls makes it clear that "the difference 
principle... and the maximin rule for decision under uncertainty are two very distinct 
things" and that "in arguing for the difference principle...there is no appeal to the 
maximin rule" (Rawls 2001, 43, note 3).5  
For this reason, this paper will stay neutral on these matters, that is, on 
whether the view discussed here is properly attributable to Rawls or not. The view is 
fairly well spread in the literature6	   and, arguably, deserves discussion in its own 
right, independently of whether it turns out to be relevant to Rawls’s conception of 
justice or not. This view – call it the maximin view - amounts to the following to 
claims: 
 
The Maximin-Risk Aversion Link: Maximin is the right decision strategy 
behind the veil of ignorance, given the inherent risk aversion of the dm’s. 
 
The Maximin – Justice Link: The employment of maximin behind the veil 
justifies giving the worse off the best possible position in society. 
 
The choice problem the decision makers (henceforth dm´s) are supposedly 
presented with affords, at a first approximation, an illustration along the following 
lines: let S1 stand for the state in which our dm ends up among the less fortunate, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, e.g., Harsanyi (1975), Resnick (1987), Binmore (1994), Agner (2002). 
5 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me and for very helpful clarifications 
on the matter. For discussion, see, for instance, Joshua Cohen (1989), Brian Barry (1989, 179) and 
Rawls himself (2001, 43). Furthermore, the difference principle only comes second in Rawls’s 
priority order, after a principle regulating equal liberties. As such, discussing Rawls’s entire 
conception of justice as resting on his taste in decision strategies is, to say the least, apt to give rise to 
controversy. 
6 See footnote 2. 
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and S2 for the happy outcome of her being in the well-off group. Our dm is thus, 
according to Rawls, presented with a choice between a society governed by his 
Difference Principle (A1) and an average-utilitiarian society (A2): 
 
Decision Table 1. Maximin vs. Expected Utility:  The Scapegoat 
 S1 S2 
A1 40 60 
A2 0 120 
 
 
Given that our dm´s entire life, and maybe that of her children and her children´s 
children too, hinges on this choice, A1 does seem like the clever path to pursue – at 
least on this illustration. After all, no one in their right mind, I take it, would risk 
ending up among the poor in A2 – and having to struggle for survival - just for the 
sake of better average utility. Also, while A1 does seem to preserve enough 
egalitarian flavour for it to be deemed fair to the poor, it seems to also reward hard 
work and excellence – at least to some degree.  
 In his famous critique of Rawls, though, John Harsanyi argues that, while 
some degree of risk-aversion within the original position is rationally sustainable by 
the uniqueness of the situation and the weight of the decision, Rawlsian agents are 
characterized by an extreme, highly irrational risk-aversion in choosing the maximin 
strategy (1975, 598).  
 In support of his account, Harsanyi offers the following case: suppose you 
lived in New York and you received two job offers. The first would be a poorly paid 
local job, and the second would be an excellently paid one in Chicago. Of course, if 
you were to choose the Chicago one, you would have to travel by plane to get there. 
Maximin would, in this case, oblige you to choose the local job, since its worst case 
scenario (living on a lower income) is much better than the one involved in taking 
the Chicago job (dying in an airplane crash). Obviously, choosing according to a 
maximin strategy in this situation sounds highly irrational. As Harsanyi puts it, 
6	  
	  
maximin would also prescribe hilarious approaches to everyday life: "you could not 
ever cross a street (after all, you might be hit by a car); you could never drive over a 
bridge (after all, it might collapse); you could never get married (after all, it might 
end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really acted this way he would soon end up in a 
mental institution."(1975, 598) 
 However, there is a problem with this line of argumentation. When one 
chooses to take the Chicago job, it seems that one considers the known low 
probability of a plane crash, similar to the probability of being run over by a car 
when crossing the street, and having a bridge collapse under you while driving. In 
Rawls's original position, on the other hand, the probability of ending up amongst the 
worst off is not known, so the rational decision is not as obvious. For all our dm 
knows, the society in question might just as well have either a 90% or a 10% poverty 
rate. If, say, one suspected a 80% chance to die in a plane crash while going to 
Chicago, choosing the job in New York would presumably not seem like such a bad 
idea anymore. 
 Still, the idea behind Harsanyi´s story stands: guiding one´s life according to 
maximin, even in situations of complete ignorance, might sound highly irrational for 
many every day cases. Consider my choice to use a blue pen instead of my usual 
black one, just for the sake of changing something in my everyday routine. I have no 
idea what the probabilities involved in my being not satisfied with my choice are; 
that is, given that I have just randomly picked a pen from my jar, it might very well 
be an old one, which, in the worst case scenario, would stop working right in the 
middle of my work, and I would have to go pick another one. This would never 
happen with my usual black one, I know it, I have just bought it last week. Maximin, 
in this case, would forbid my changing my routine. If the dissatisfaction involved in 
having to change my pen in the middle of my work is at least slightly higher than the 
one produced by my continuing to write with my usual pen, I should never risk it; so 
no new pens for me from now on. And no new dishes, new haircuts or new friends, 
inasmuch as the old ones are just fine. 
 Of course, given how little hinges on my decision in these cases, the maximin 
7	  
	  
recommendation sounds a bit extreme.  
 Still, this is not the case behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The 
importance of our dm´s choice there is undisputable, as are the bad consequences she 
might face if she decides to take the risk. Table 1 seems to illustrate precisely how 
the maximin choice does a better job in decisions under ignorance when the stakes 
are high. Even if in low-stakes situations one might consider risking it for the sake of 
the chance of getting those 120 utility units featured in A2, the obvious choice in life 
or death situations like the one behind the veil is A1.  
 Harsanyi, however, argues that describing the situation like in Table 1 is far 
from covering the possible outcomes of the choice in the original position.  
 Harsanyi invites us to imagine that our dm ends up in a blessed society where 
the worst off are in a harsh minority. He argues that, while the moral flaw of the 
utility principle was that it allowed for the sacrifice of a minority, in aiming for the 
increased good of the majority, the maximin choice allows for an even more 
abominable situation: namely, for the sacrifice of a large majority for the interest of a 
small minority, no matter what the circumstances, even under the most extreme 
conditions, and even if the interests of the worst-off minority would only be affected 
in a very minor way. Harsanyi’s case goes as follows: 
 
[…] let us assume that society would consist of a large number of individuals, of 
whom one would be [intellectually challenged]. Suppose that some extremely 
expensive treatment were to become available, which could very slightly 
improve the [latter’s] condition, [say, a treatment which would enable her/him to 
tie her/his own shoe-laces], but at such high costs that this treatment could be 
financed only if some of the most brilliant individuals were deprived of all 
higher education. The difference principle would require that the [intellectually 
challenged] individual should all the same receive this very expensive treatment 
at any event—no matter how many people would have to be denied a higher 
education, and no matter how strongly they would desire to obtain one (and no 
matter how great the satisfaction they would derive from it) (Harsanyi 1975, 
599). 
 
Thus, Harsanyi argues that the rational strategy to endorse in the original position 
would be the principle of insufficient reason (PIR), and not a maximin strategy. 
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According to PIR, in situations characterized by radical uncertainty, the rational path 
to pursue is to assign equal subjective probabilities to all possible outcomes. Further 
on, Harsanyi argues, agents will choose to maximize expected utility (Harsanyi 
1975, 601).  
 
 
3. Objections to Harsanyi 
 
Still, the question seems, by now, to amount to deciding between risking to be 
harshly taxed for the benefit of a small minority of less naturally endowed – in a 
maximin society - or risking to be among the worst off in a utilitarian society. The 
latter, of course, might imply finding oneself way below a decent level of welfare. 
 This has led to a wide spread support for a maximin choice. It is argued7 that 
1) since in Rawls´s original position we have no reason for choosing one probability 
assignment over another, there are no grounds for the equiprobable assignment 
implicit in the principle of insufficient reason; 2) while this does not lead us directly 
to the maximin rule, the particular decision at hand mandates its use. Here is Michael 
Resnick on the latter: “First, the consequences of making a bad choice are extremely 
serious. One could end up being the only serf in a society of nobles. Second, we do 
not need great amounts of wealth or power to lead happy lives. Realizing this, 
rational individuals will hardly regret missing a chance to be rich or powerful” 
(1987, 43). 
 I will treat both the above objections in turn, starting with the latter.  
 
 
3.1 What Does the Maximiner Risk? 
 
Notice Resnick´s focus on the downsides of acting on utilitarian considerations; the 
assumption here is that the choice with which our dm is presented is, in fact, between 
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risking to be a “serf in a society of nobles”, on one hand, and risking to lose some 
amount of wealth, on the other8. Presumably, what defenders of maximin have in 
mind is a choice between ending up in Denmark – and dealing with the 
corresponding high tax levels - and risking to be dying of hunger in Hong Kong. As 
such, the maximin strategy does sound intuitively right.  
 However, consider the following variation on Harsanyi´s objections. Let us 
assign one utility unit to a life which is barely worth living, two units to someone 
living a similar life, but getting an apple a week for dinner, and 100 to a great life on 
a luxury island. Given the complete ignorance imposed by Rawls, our dm might be 
faced with, for instance, the following outcomes (with states S1 to S10 designating 
the level of welfare associated with ending up in different groups):9  
 
Decision Table 2. Maximin vs. Expected Utility: Barely Worth Living 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A110 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
A2 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
It seems that the choice between a maximin society and an average utilitarian society 
need not be one between Denmark and Hong Kong. I take it that most of us share the 
thought that A2 is the intuitively right choice here. After all, there is a pretty high 
chance one might end up with a nice level of welfare. The maximin strategy, though, 
picks out A1, for its one-utility-unit-advantage attached to the worst case scenario.  
 Since egalitarians might still be resistant to this intuition, though, let us move 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Kristin Shrader-Frechette (1991: 107) argues in a similar vein that “many rational people do not 
wish to gamble, especially if their lives are at stake.[…] For example, why should one choose to avoid 
an airplane delay (a benefit) at the risk or cost of facing a 10 % probability that an essential 
mechanism on the plane will break down? A perfectly rational response, in such a situation, might be 
that one does not gamble with one's life except to obtain a comparably great benefit.” 
9 On Rawls’s view, of course, or dm cannot know that he is facing the probabilities described in the 
tables below. However, this objection does not affect the point made by this paper. That is because the 
dm can know that these are probabilities he might be facing, which is all this argument needs in order 
to go through.  
10 Here and below I keep with Rawls´s motivational inequalities, even though they hardly make much 
difference to my illustrations. 
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below the neutrality level; that is, let us bring lives of great suffering into the 
equation. After all, the Rawlsian dm´s have no clue regarding the total amount of 
primary goods they are about to share; for all they know, they might end up in quite 
a horrible situation in this respect. Compare, then: 
 
Decision Table 3. Maximin vs. Expected Utility: The Torture Case 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A1 -10 -8 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
A2 -11 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Here, even for the strictest egalitarian out there, A1, the maximin choice, cannot 
sound intuitively right. Choosing to bring so much suffering into the world can 
hardly make the world a better place. If our dm´s risk aversion recommends the 
maximin option here – that is, acting on A1, just for the sake of not risking one extra 
unit of suffering – Harsanyi´s irrationality charges do begin to sound appropriate.  
 As such, contrary to the prevailing position in the literature, maximin no 
longer seems bound to benefit our dm´s risk aversion. It looks as if, while the risk of 
being a serf in Harsanyi´s society of nobles is, of course, not negligible, exchanging 
it for a high chance to a life of great suffering does not sound intuitively right either.  
 
 
3.2 The Equiprobability Assumption 
 
Let us then turn to the more theoretical concerns presented in the literature, 
questioning the rationality behind Harsanyi´s equiprobability assumption. Assigning 
sharp subjective probabilities in situations of complete ignorance has been widely 
criticized as unwarranted. This has led to the popularity of ‘imprecise’ models of 
decision making. Thus, it is argued, the rational thing to do in conditions of radical 
uncertainty is not to assign sharp probabilities to the possible outcomes, but rather to 
assign un-sharp, interval valued probabilities. Here is Isaac Levi: 
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It is sometimes rational to make no determinate probability judgment and, 
indeed, to make maximally indeterminate judgments....[doing so] may derive 
from a very clear and cool judgment that on the basis of the available evidence, 
making a numerically determinate judgment would be unwarranted and arbitrary 
(1985, 396). 
 
That is to say that, under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, rational agents should 
refrain from assigning probabilities symmetrically, and rather endorse interval 
valued probabilities of the form P(S) = [10%, 80%], where S is the possible outcome 
regarding an agent's eventual position in society.  
 Given this, Erik Angner (2002) argues that if we accept Levi’s theory of 
decision, we can reject Harsanyi’s charge that maximin reasoning in the original 
position must be irrational: “According to Levi’s theory, there are conditions under 
which it is rationally permissible to have indeterminate probabilities […], and to let 
choice be guided by some form of the maximin criterion rather than by expected 
utility maximization.[...][T]hose conditions [...] in fact obtain in the original position 
as Rawls describes it"(2002, 2). 
 Following Levi, under extreme uncertainty with regard to both probabilities 
and utilities, the dm first calculates which alternatives are E-admissible. An act A is 
E-admissible if and only if there is a probability function in the agent’s credal set 
such that, according to it, for any alternative act B, the expected utility of A is at 
least as great as that of B. 
 In case there is more than one E-admissible alternative, the agent may rely on 
some secondary criterion. For instance, he may choose some E-admissible 
alternative that maximizes security, using a maximin strategy (Levi 1997, 194). The 
agent is not, however, required to rely on security considerations to break ties. 
 Returning to Rawls's original position, suppose again that agents are 
presented with a choice between a society governed by Harsanyi's utilitiarian account 
and one where redistribution mostly benefits the worst off. The agents' extreme 
ignorance would, according to Levi, make them first consider which of the two 
alternative outcomes is E-admissible. Given this characterization of the decision 
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problem, it is a simple matter to find probabilities and utilities such that adopting 
Rawls’s principles is optimal; similarly, it is straightforward to find probabilities and 
utilities such that adopting Harsanyi’s principles is optimal. Thus, both alternatives 
turn out E-admissible (Angner 2002, 15). 
 Hence, according to Levi, a choice may be made on the basis of maximin 
considerations (and, if so, choosing the society benefitting the worst off is uniquely 
admissible). Thus, Levi's account does help in refuting Harsanyi's characterization of 
the use of maximin as highly irrational. 
 Still, using maximin as a second criterion is not rationally required, but 
dependent on the agents' own “value judgment" (Levi 1980,162). This, of course, 
seems to leave the decision problem under the veil open, as Rawls's claim is certainly 
stronger; according to Rawls, maximin is the only rational strategy to endorse in the 
original position. 
 If we trust Levi´s claim that, if the dm is interested in maximizing security, 
he should go with a maximin strategy, we might conclude with Angner that the 
conditions described by Levi do obtain in Rawls´s original position. Still, we have 
seen in the previous section that security need not necessarily be associated with a 
maximin strategy. Recall that, in Table 3, our dm would have risked quite an 
impressive amount of suffering from using such strategy. While choosing a 
utilitarian society does come with its associated risks too, maximin seems more the 
strategy of the pessimist, than of the risk-averse. This decision maker focuses 
exclusively on the worst case scenario, without taking into consideration any other 
possible outcome. This, however, as already illustrated, might expose the dm to a 
pretty high chance to living a horrible life. Thus, using maximin fails to meet Levi´s 
security condition.  
 There is, however, one line of defence still left open to the supporters of 
maximin; let us take another look at Tables 2 and 3 above; what goes wrong for the 
maximiner in these cases seems to rest upon the one unit difference of utility in S1. 
Thus, what triggers the counter-intuitive results is precisely the fact that, although in 
a harsh minority, the worst off in Harsanyi´s society seem to fare a bit worse than 
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those in the maximin society. Given this, one might argue that the unfairness of the 
worst off situation should be kept to a minimum, no matter the number of members 
in the worst off group, and no matter their minoritarian status. After all, a society in 
which one of its members is subjected to excruciating torture every day does not 
seem to become more just in virtue of adding more happy members to it. To the 
contrary, what might do the trick is any improvement, however small, to the poor 
man´s situation. Similarly, our risk-averse dm, when considering her options, might 
prefer renouncing whatever chance of ending up among the rich in Harsanyi´s 
society, for the slightest improvement on her horrible situation if she ends up being 
in the worst off group. 
 Howerver, while the fact that our intuitions go with Harsanyi in Tables 2 and 
3 does rest upon the high probability of enjoying a good life featured by the 
utilitarian option, the slight improvement on the worst off situation in S1 is not 
necessary for the argument to go through. That is to say that maximin can get the 
wrong result even in a situation where the level of welfare for the worst off remained 
constant in both acts. Consider: 
 
Decision Table 4. Maximin vs. Expected Utility: Equal Minimum 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A2 0 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
 
When there are two or more acts whose minimums are maximal, maximin counts 
them as equally good. We thus have to resort to lexical maximin to break ties. This 
tells us to first eliminate all the rows except the tied ones and then compare the next 
lowest entries, until the tie is broken or the table is exhausted. 
 In the case above the intuitively correct act is A2. Maximin recommends A1. 
The worst possible outcome for both A1 and A2 is 0. So for a tie-breaker we 
consider the second-worst possible outcome, which is 99 in A2 and 100 in A1. So we 
maximize and choose A1.  
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 As such, returning to the case of the torturer, not only does maximin not 
succeed in relieving the poor guy from some of his pain. Against all claims to 
security, maximin allows for most of the members of society to be subjected to 
torture, inasmuch as at least one person enjoys a better life than Harsanyi´s well off 
group.  
 Recall the charge against average utilitarianism we started with. Rawls 
dismisses utilitarian considerations from his choice room by arguing that, as long as 
the utility principle allows for the sacrifice of innocent scapegoats for the greater 
good of the greater number, agents could not risk being among such scapegoats. 
Still, in the case above, maximin allows for the sacrifice of the greater number of 
innocent scapegoats for the greater good of a very small minority. As such, for our 
risk-averse dm, the advantage seems to eventually lie with Harsanyi.  
 Furthermore, even though our intuitions in Table 3 seem to accord with 
Harsanyi´s due to the high probability involved in ending up in the well-off group, 
this presupposition is not necessary for dismissing maximin either. Consider our 
dm´s being faced with a choice between the following outcomes: 
 
Decision Table 5. Maximin vs. Expected Utility: No High Probability 
Assumption. 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A1 -10 -9 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
A2 -11 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 100 100 100 100 
 
In the above chart, the choice is between two societies featuring quite an impressive 
amount of suffering. Also, the probability involved in ending up with 100 utility 
units on A2 is quite low (that is, below Harsanyi´s ½ assumption).  However, acting 
on A2 might still secure some chances for our dm to avoid suffering, if she is lucky 
enough and S7 to S10 obtain. If she goes with A1, the maximin option, though, all 
she can expect is slight variations on her level of pain. 
 Thus, even if we drop Harsanyi´s equi-probability assumption, maximin still 
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does not fare better in according with our dm´s risk aversion. Even if we grant that 
assigning any probabilities whatsoever behind the veil is unjustified, any act which 
gives our dm the slightest chance of not being subject to a miserable life seems worth 
taking.  
 
 
4. The Minimax Regret Option 
 
I have argued that maximin is more the strategy of the pessimist, than of the risk-
averse. This decision maker acts as if the worst that can happen will happen, and 
chooses the best worst case scenario. Examples such as the ones above, where the 
decision maker rejected a high chance at a decent life to avoid a potential loss of 
little significance, suggest that using maximin contradicts the very risk aversion 
Rawls has thrown upon his agents. As such, it might be more relevant for Rawlsian 
agents to focus on missed opportunities rather than on the worst possible outcomes. 
 In Table 2, for instance, the dm misses a chance to gain 99 extra utility units 
if he chooses A1 and S3 to S10 obtain, while by choosing A2 he only misses an 
opportunity to gain one extra utility unit if S1 obtains. The strategy usually 
associated with cautious, risk-averse agents, securing all possible outcomes, is 
minimax regret (MR). This is an approach to decision making under uncertainty in 
which the opportunity cost (regret) associated with each possible course of action is 
measured, and the decision-maker selects the activity that minimizes the maximum 
regret, or loss. Regret for an act-state pair is measured as the difference between the 
best possible payoff for that state and the payoff corresponding to that specific act. 
 Minimax regret captures aversion to lost opportunities. Thus, agents’ choice 
under the veil would not only imply maximizing the worst possible pay-off, but 
would rather recommend minimizing the maximum opportunity loss on all possible 
outcomes. For each act, we calculate the amount of missed opportunity in each of the 
states; that is, how much the outcome for that act in that state falls short of the best 
possible outcome for that act in that state. MR requires to find the maximum amount 
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of regret for each act, then choose the act with the smallest maximum amount of 
regret. 
 The maximum regret for A1 in Table 2, for instance, is 99 (if S3 to S10 
obtain) and that for A2 is only 1 (if S1 obtains). Hence, this strategy nicely predicts 
A2 as the best option here.  
 Also, notice that MR is a non-probabilistic strategy; as such, it shares with 
maximin the advantage of not having to presume any assignment of probabilities 
whatsoever behind the veil, which fits better with the radical ignorance featured in 
Rawls’s setting.   
 Furthermore, for a large number of cases, MR nicely accords with our 
intuitions by avoiding giving the extreme predictions of both maximin and average 
utilitarianism. Consider: 
 
Decision Table 6. Minimax Regret on Top 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
A1 3 4 3 3 3 3 
A2 -7 50 50 50 50 50 
A3 2 45 45 45 45 45 
 
Let us take the level of sufficiency – say, having a decent shelter and reasonable 
access to primary goods - to be around 10 utility units. The maximin act in the above 
situation is A1, for its best worst case payoff of 3 utility units. Notice that, again, our 
dm thus fails to consider her high chances of earning the 50 or, respectively, the 40 
utility units involved in A2 and A3. As such, using maximin exposes her to a sure 
life barely worth living, way below the sufficiency level. A2, the average utilitarian 
option, on the other hand, looks risky enough too; given that, if S1 obtains, our dm 
will be faced with a life of suffering, she might not want to take her chances.  
 Given the corresponding regret chart, the minimax regret act – and, I take it, 
the intuitively right act here – is A3: 
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Regret Table 6  
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
A1 0 46 47 47 47 47 
A2 10 0 0 0 0 0 
A3 1 5 5 5 5 5 
 
The minimax regret rule demands that we should pick the act whose maximum regret 
is minimal. The maximum opportunity loss for A1, corresponding to states S3 to S6, 
is 47; if she decides to act on A2 and S1 obtains, our dm gets 10 regret units. While 
in the case of A3, the maximum loss is 5, for S2 to S6.  Thus, the minimum 
maximum regret is involved in acting on A3. This fits nicely with our intuitions too; 
surely, just for the sake of the one-unit difference between A3 and A1 for S1, we 
would not have our dm choose to live in a society where everybody is way below 
sufficiency level. Also, given the high stakes of the situation, our dm would not risk 
acting on A2, no matter the high chances of her being fairly rich.  
 A3 has the advantage of involving small losses on both the best and the worst 
case scenario. If S1 obtains, our dm’s level of welfare will only be slightly lower 
than on the A1 option, while if S3 obtains, our dm will be only slightly less rich than 
on A2. As such, on this illustration, our risk-averse dm seems to secure all possible 
outcomes. 
 
 
4.1Problems for Minimax Regret 
 
In what follows, I will argue that, in spite of its initial appeal, the use of minimax 
regret is not a sound escape route for the defender of the non-probabilistic approach 
to Rawls´s original position either. That is, I will purport to show that the use of MR 
is neither theoretically more justified nor involving fewer risks for the Rawlsian 
agents than maximizing expected utility. 
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 As nicely as it might seem to handle a vast number of cases, MR does come 
with associated costs too.  
 First, notably, MR violates the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA). IIA specifies that preference between two given actions should 
not be influenced by the availability of other actions. However, given that regret for 
a state-act pair is calculated by reference to the payoffs of all the available acts for 
that state, adding new acts to the equation modifies the MR evaluation.  As such, 
minimax regret modifies the value attached to one outcome or another with the 
regrets associated with having lost some opportunity or another. Recall, however, 
Resnick:  ”[…] we do not need great amounts of wealth or power to lead happy lives. 
Realizing this, rational individuals will hardly regret missing a chance to be rich or 
powerful” (1987, 43). 
 Even if we put theoretical concerns aside, on a closer analysis, minimax 
regret can be shown to fail in what keeping with our dm’s risk aversion is concerned. 
Thus, eventually, the question boils down to deciding which strategy comes with less 
serious risks attached and with fewer theoretical costs. In this regard, although giving 
nice predictions in a series of cases, on closer analysis, MR shares in some of the 
most serious weaknesses of both average utilitarianism and maximin.  
Consider again: 
 
Decision Table 1. Maximin vs. Expected Utility:  The Scapegoat 
 S1 S2 
A1 40 60 
A2 0 120 
 
Regret Table 1 
 S1 S2 
A1 0 60 
A2 40 0 
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 Recall that the intuitive appeal of maximin was due to its avoiding outcomes similar 
to the A2-S1 pair. If our dm’s entire life depends on her choice in Table 1, 
maximizing expected utility at the risk of ending up with 0 utility units does not 
sound like the most fortunate decision to make. Notice, however, that minimax regret 
goes with Harsanyi – and against our intuitions – on this one; the maximum regret 
associated with A1 (60 on S2) is higher than the one associated with A2 (40 on s1), 
so MR picks out A2, the average utilitarian option.  
 Of course, this difficulty, by itself, does not yet dismiss MR from the 
candidate strategies for Rawls’s scenario. After all, we have already ruled out 
maximin, for involving more serious risks for our dm than average utilitarianism. 
Thus, given that we are left with a choice between MR and Harsanyi’s principle of 
insufficient reason, minimax regret maintains its advantage of being a non-
probabilistic strategy, in a setup characterized by extreme ignorance.  
 Let me refer you back to Table 4, however:  
 
Decision Table 4. Maximin vs. Expected Utility: Equal Minimum 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A2 0 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
 
Regret Table 4 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
A1 0 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
A2 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Here, the minimax regret act is A1. Thus, MR gives the same counterintuitive 
prediction as maximin this time around.  
 Furthermore, if we look at both cases together, the result is far from flattering 
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our dm’s risk aversion. Recall that the problem involved in Harsanyi’s decision 
strategy was that it allowed for the sacrifice of innocent scapegoats for the greater 
good of the greater number. We have seen that, as bad as this sounds, this is certainly 
preferable to the risks involved in using maximin; this strategy was shown to allow 
for the sacrifice of the greater number for the greater good of a very small minority. 
In the light of the above illustrations, though, minimax regret seems to allow for the 
most abominable situation: in using this decision strategy, our dm risks on both 
fronts, and is not securing any outcome. She leaves open the possibility of being “a 
serf in a society of nobles”, while, at the same time, risking to end up with a life 
barely worth living for the sake of the higher good of a small minority. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have questioned here the theoretical presuppositions lying at the heart of the 
objections brought to Harsanyi´s utilitarian reply to Rawls.  
 I have argued that, in Rawls´s scenario, the use of non-probabilistic strategies 
usually associated with cautious decision makers is not doing a better job than 
expected utility maximization in accommodating the agents´ risk aversion. 
Furthermore, I have shown that even if we drop Harsanyi´s equiprobability 
assumption, maximin and minimax regret still do not fare better in keeping with our 
dm´s risk aversion, and thus fail to constitute viable alternatives to the utilitarian 
strategy.  
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